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ABSTRACT
The Differentiated Service (Diff-Serv) architecture [1] advo-
cates a model based on different “granularity” at network edges
and within the network. In particular, core routers are only
required to act on a few aggregates that are meant to offer a
pre-defined set of service levels. The use of aggregation raises a
number of questions for end-to-end services, in particular when
crossing domain boundaries where policing actions may be ap-
plied. This paper focuses on the impact of such policing actions
in the context of individual and bulk services built on top of the
Expedited Forwarding (EF) [7] per-hop-behavior (PHB). The
findings of this investigation confirm and quantify the expected
need for reshaping at network boundaries, and identify a num-
ber of somewhat unexpected behaviors. Recommendations are
also made for when reshaping is not available.
1. INTRODUCTION
Support for some form of service guarantees in IP networks is
becoming an important requirement, not only because of emerging
multimedia applications, but also because of new usages embodied
in service level agreements between users and providers. This is
one of the motivations behind the Differentiated Services standard-
ization efforts carried out by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) [1]. The Differentiated Services framework relies on a small
number of service levels, or Per Hop Behaviors (PHBs), that each
specifies how a router should treat the corresponding packets. At
least two types of treatments are being standardized: The Assured
Forwarding (AF) group of PHBs [4], and the Expedited Forward-
ing (EF) PHB [7]. The aggregate model of Diff-Serv is highly
scalable, but it also raises questions in terms of the type of ser-
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vices it can provide. For example, because all packets within a
PHB are treated the same way, the granularity of “services” that
can be offered is unclear. In this paper, we concentrate on the po-
tential penalty imposed by aggregating traffic into a small number
of packet treatments, in terms of the conformance of flows as they
exit a Diff-Serv domain. Conformance is measured in relation to a
policer (see [5, 6] for two possible examples), that controls the vol-
ume and timing of packet transmissions. There are several reasons
for why such a measure is of interest. First, it provides a simple ref-
erence point for estimating the level of “perturbations” caused by
interactions between flows aggregated in the same PHB1. Second,
it quantifies those perturbations in terms of the “contract” viola-
tions they translate into, namely, the number of non-conformant
packets they create as seen by an egress policer. Such a contractual
comparison is meaningful in environments where flows cross mul-
tiple Diff-Serv domains, and where policing actions are applied at
(provider) domain boundaries.
In that context, we consider two possible service configurations.
The first corresponds to an end-to-end service model, where a cus-
tomer has established individual contracts with all the providers
on its path. In such an instance, policing at domain boundaries is
performed on the set of packets associated with each customer, as
providers will typically not trust the policing performed by other
providers. The second configuration assumes that customers nego-
tiate service contracts only with their local provider, which is then
responsible for securing the necessary (peering) agreements with
other providers it connects to. In this case, policing at boundaries
between provider domains will be based on aggregates correspond-
ing to the bulk contracts negotiated between providers.
In the paper, we investigate the above issues in the context of
a service based on the EF PHB. We assume that user EF traffic is
shaped on ingress to conform to a single token bucket filter that
controls long term rate and burst size2, and we study the extent to
which it becomes non-conformant after crossing a Diff-Serv do-
main. Egress non-conformance is evaluated using another token
bucket to determine the number of non-conformant packets, as well
as the distribution of the amount of time by which they are non-
conformant. This is aimed at assessing the impact of aggregation
and the need for egress reshaping. Reshaping has been mentioned
as a possible requirement for services based on the EF PHB [7, 10],
but where and the extent to which it is needed is still unclear. In
particular, because of the need to compute conformance times and
1In this paper, we concentrate on interactions within a PHB, and
ignore those caused by interactions across PHBs.
2In conformance with the “spirit” of [10], the burst size is limited
to one or two maximum size packets.
hold packets until they become conformant, reshaping adds com-
plexity, especially on high speed adapters. Furthermore, the non-
work-conserving nature of shapers also requires additional buffers
and contributes to higher delays. Hence, its introduction comes at
a cost that must be weighed against the benefits it provides. One
contribution of this paper is to quantify the expected importance of
reshaping, and when it is not available, identify parameters and
alternatives that can be used to mitigate the impact of the non-
conformance induced by traffic aggregation. The investigation is
carried out by simulation to allow a wide range of scenarios with
various user traffic, policer parameters, interfering traffic patterns,
and network and service configurations.
1.1 Previous Works
The motivation for this work is to gain a better understanding of
the impact of aggregation on conformance checks that may be per-
formed at network boundaries. Several previous works have looked
at similar issues, and their answers provided additional incentives
for exploring this topic.
A first such work is [2], which explored through simulations the
effect of bunching on CBR [15] streams as they merge with other
such streams and travel through multiple network nodes3. The pa-
per assumed fixed size packets (ATM cells), and focused on es-
timating the size of the egress play-out buffers required to recre-
ate the constant rate of a CBR stream. Both the environment and
goals of this paper are somewhat different, as we allow greater vari-
ability (within the conformance bounds of the policer) in the user
traffic (packet sizes, burst sizes, rates, etc.) and are primarily in-
terested in assessing how the bunching introduced by the network
affects egress conformance. Nevertheless, several results in [2] are
relevant to our study, in particular the fact that the bunching occur-
ring in the network was found not to significantly affect end-to-end
delays. This suggests that it should be possible to remove non-
conformance on egress through the use of small reshaping buffers.
This is an aspect we investigate further.
Another more recent paper that addressed a similar topic is [14],
which extended [2] by allowing different packet sizes across flows.
The motivation for this extension was, as in our case, the introduc-
tion of services based on the EF PHB in IP networks. As in [2],
the study is aimed at constant rate traffic and targets a similar set
of measures, namely, end-to-end delay and reshaping buffer sizing.
However, it also considers additional measures of the level of dis-
tortion introduced by aggregation, and evaluates the distribution of
inter-packet separation at the network egress. Such a measure is
closer to the conformance measure we are interested in, although
there can be substantial differences between the two. For example,
smaller variations in inter-packet spacing need not translate into
fewer non-conformant packets on egress. There are also differences
between [14] and this paper in terms of the scenarios being consid-
ered, e.g., extensions that consider variable rate streams and packet
variability within streams. Those differences together with our fo-
cus on conformance lead to different conclusions in several cases.
For example, while both [14] and this paper note that the bandwidth
of an individual flow affects the variation of inter-packet spacing it
experiences, conclusions differ when it comes to the impact of net-
work utilization.
A last work that partly influenced and motivated the study under-
taken in this paper is [8]. This paper establishes a result, which de-
spite some limiting assumptions, i.e., feed-forward networks, sat-
urated queues, and fixed size packets, has interesting implications
for the support of fixed rate traffic in packet networks. It basically
3A similarly motivated study but focusing on interactions with a
wider range of cross traffic can be found in [3].
states that when input traffic is smoother than Poisson and it only
interacts with similar traffic, it retains that smoothness when cross-
ing a network4. In other words, the bunching of traffic that the
network can potentially introduce will not increase the burstiness5
of the traffic above and beyond that of a Poisson process. However,
the use of ingress and egress policers together with variability in
packet sizes and network loads go beyond the model of [8], and
were one of the motivations for this study.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the simulation environment and its parameters together with
the various performance measures being investigated. Section 3 is
devoted to a set of basic experiments, that rely on homogeneous
traffic sources. Section 4 carries out a similar investigation, but al-
lows heterogeneity in traffic sources and assesses how such varia-
tions affect the findings of Section 3. Finally, Section 5 summarizes
the findings of the paper.
2. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY
In order to investigate the issues described in the previous sec-
tion, a simulation environment was developed using the NS-2 simu-
lator [11], to which a number of modifications and extensions were
applied in order to accommodate the requirements of this study. In
all scenarios, 90% confidence levels were targeted, and the corre-
sponding confidence intervals are shown in the figures even if they
are occasionally difficult to discern due to their small size. Figure 1
shows the generic topology and setup used in most of the experi-
ments we report on in this paper. The topology is a linear multi-hop
topology which has been widely used in previous works, e.g., see
[14] and references therein. In this topology, a variable number
of “tagged” EF streams enter the network at the ingress (first) node
R
1
, and traverse all the other nodes until they reach the egress node
R
n
. The tagged streams are those whose performance is monitored
at both egress and intermediate nodes. In order to emulate interac-
tions with cross-traffic, external traffic is injected at every node on
the path. In our investigation, this cross-traffic consists only of EF
traffic as our focus is on the impact of aggregation, i.e., interactions
between like streams. We assume that the impact of other traffic
classes is minimal, e.g., because of the use of priority queues (EF
traffic is assigned to the higher priority) or a scheduling mechanism
such as weighted fair queueing that isolates traffic classes.
Note that while the linear topology of Figure 1 is rather simple,
it can be configured to allow a wide range of interfering traffic pat-
terns. In the experiments we report on in the paper, cross-traffic
entering at a given node is restricted to interfering with the tagged
streams for only one hop, i.e., it leaves the network at the next hop.
This is meant to limit the number of parameters that need to be
specified and simplify the discussion of the results. Several other
configurations were also investigated, which varied the number of
hops over which cross-traffic interfered with tagged streams and
the number of interfering streams. No substantial differences were
observed between those scenarios and the single hop interference
one, which was therefore chosen because of its simplicity. In the
context of this scenario, there are nevertheless a number of other
parameters that can be varied. These include the number of hops
traveled by the tagged streams, the number of tagged and cross
streams, and the total link load. Most experiments involve streams
4It should be noted that this result was first conjectured in [12], and
that there had been a number of previous works, e.g., [9, 13] aimed
at quantifying the perturbations experienced by a CBR stream as it
crosses a network.
5The results of [8] are for a specific definition of traffic ordering,
and the interested reader is referred to the paper for details.
(tagged and cross-traffic) with similar characteristics, i.e., a homo-
geneous environment, so that link load and the relative weight of
tagged traffic and cross-traffic is simply a function of the number
of streams in each category. However, the impact of heterogeneous
stream characteristics, i.e., different bandwidth and/or packet sizes,
is also investigated in a small number experiments.
traffic
Tagged
traffic
Cross
R1 R2 R3 Rn
Figure 1: Generic scenario.
Traffic sources are based on a packet generator driven by a re-
newal packet arrival process, and connected to a traffic conditioner
in the form of a token bucket filter with parameters (R; b) (see fig-
ure 2). The token bucket is configured to act as a shaper, and en-
sures that all packets forwarded into the network are conformant
with the specified traffic contract. A variety of traffic sources were
used as inputs to the token bucket, e.g., sources with inter-packet
times distributed according to Pareto or exponential distributions,
or based simply on a jittered constant time. Because of the traffic
conditioning effect of the token bucket, the choice of a particular
distribution was found to have only a minor impact on performance,
at least in terms of its impact on egress conformance. As a result,
and for the sake of simplicity, the results reported in this paper rely
only on a Poisson input. Clearly, this is not meant to be representa-
tive of “real” traffic patterns in IP networks, but its single parameter
characterization and ease of generation make a Poisson input a con-
venient tool to systematically explore the range of possible traffic
mixes and intensities. Again, the justification for such a choice is
that because of the normative effect of the shaper, only minor dif-
ferences were observed in terms of egress conformance between
Poisson and, say, Pareto, inputs.
sk
tk Inter Departure Time
Packet Size
sk+1 sk
tk
R
b
Token Bucket Filter
Token Bucket
Shaping Buffer
Figure 2: Source model.
In most scenarios, the bucket size (b) was set to twice the aver-
age packet size, and the token rate (R) was usually set at a value
25% higher than the average input rate. This margin was chosen to
avoid consistently reshaping the traffic into a constant rate stream,
that would essentially eliminate differences between input streams.
Furthermore, it is to be expected that users will specify traffic con-
tract that exceed by some amount, e.g., 25%, their average traffic
volume, in order to accommodate most traffic patterns without ex-
cessive reshaping delays. Finally, a last parameter that we vary in
our experiments is the link load, as it is expected to influence the
level of interactions between tagged streams and cross-traffic. In
particular, the parameter  is used to indicate the ratio between
the link bandwidth and the sum of the token rates of the streams it
carries. Note that varying  allows us to capture different imple-
mentations of the EF PHB. For example, a setting of  = 1 would
“emulate” a network where the EF PHB is supported using some
form for Fair Queueing scheduler, i.e., the EF traffic only sees the
bandwidth it has been allocated. Alternatively, a setting of, say,


= 0:5 could correspond to a network using a priority scheme
to implement the EF PHB. It should also be noted, that because
the actual packet generation rate is only 80% of the token rate, the
actual link utilization  is only 0:8  .
Upon reaching the egress routerR
n
, packets from tagged streams
are again passed through a token bucket filter (TBF ) and checked
for conformance. As mentioned before, the purpose of this egress
check is to assess the extent to which interactions within the net-
work transform a conformant stream into a non-conformant one.
This check is performed using a range of TBF configurations aimed
at evaluating different approaches to handling this non-conformance.
In particular, both the token rate and the amount of buffering at
the egress TBF are varied, e.g., egress buffering can be set any-
where between zero (strict policing) and infinity (full reshaping).
The level of egress non-conformance is measured using various
statistics such as the number of non-conformant packets, and the
distribution of the amount of time by which those packets are non-
conformant. Both measures are useful not only to quantify the im-
pact of the network on a stream’s conformance, but also to gain
some understanding into how conformance can be reestablished.
In configurations that involve a reshaping buffer, the distribution of
buffer occupancy and reshaping delay are also monitored as both
are useful indicators of the cost and efficacy of reshaping.
Measurements are carried for two settings. In the first setting,
each individual stream is associated with its own egress TBF .
This corresponds to an environment where individual (per user)
service contracts are extending across multiple providers. In the
second setting, multiple (all) tagged streams are mapped onto a
common egress TBF . This is representative of an environment
where user level contracts are mapped onto provider level contracts
when crossing provider boundaries. In other words, all the EF traf-
fic leaving provider A and entering provider B is mapped onto the
aggregate EF contract passed between providers A and B.
Before discussing the paper’s findings, we briefly pause to com-
ment on whether the experimental setting of the paper is sufficiently
“realistic” to allow conclusions that are applicable to real networks.
This is a question that is always difficult to answer in the context
of simulation based studies, and this paper is no exception. As
mentioned earlier, many more experiments were conducted than
are reported in the paper, and one of the reasons that led us to omit-
ting them was the relative lack of sensitivity of the results across
variations in topologies, interference patterns, and incoming traf-
fic characteristics. We feel that this provides a reasonable level of
confidence that the paper’s conclusions and findings should hold in
more general and different settings.
3. HOMOGENEOUS SOURCES
In this section, we consider scenarios that consist only of homo-
geneous sources, i.e., sources with identical rates and packet sizes.
This obviously wont be the case in practice, but focusing on homo-
geneous sources helps isolate the effect of individual parameters.
Heterogeneous sources are considered in Section 4.
3.1 Basic configuration
The basic configuration used in these initial investigations con-
sists of a single tagged stream (n
ts
= 1) with a fixed packet size
(500 bytes). As mentioned earlier, the traffic source associated with
the tagged stream feeds packets to its ingress TBF according to a
Poisson process. The performance of this basic configuration is ex-
plored by varying the number of hops (N), the number of cross
streams (n
cs
), the relative network load (), the egress TBF to-
ken generation rate (R
e
), and the size of the egress reshaping buffer
(B
e
).
The results of this first set of experiments are reported in Fig-
ures 3 to 8, which plot over a range of scenarios the probability P
d
that a packet is found non-conformant at the egress TBF . Except
for Figure 7 that allows shaping, the egress TBF is configured
to drop all non-conformant packets. Note that the maximum load
value of  = 1:2 shown in most figures corresponds to an actual
average link load of only 1. This is because the token generation
rate is 25% higher than the average source data rate.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
ρ*
P d
N=5 
N=10
Figure 3: Drop probability P
d
for n
cs
= 1.
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Figure 4: Drop probability P
d
for n
cs
= 20.
A first general conclusion that can be drawn from the the figures
is that simply throwing network bandwidth at the problem does not
appear to be very effective at ensuring egress conformance. In par-
ticular, we observe in Figures 3 and 4 that as the network load de-
creases, the probability of non-conformance (P
d
) hardly changes
until we reach very low network loads. One of the reasons for this
maybe counter-intuitive behavior, is that while lowering network
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
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P d
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Figure 5: Token deficit cumulative distribution on the arrival
of a non-conformant packet. N = 10, n
cs
= 100.
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Figure 6: Drop probability P
d
for N = 10.
load reduces the magnitude of the perturbations experienced by in-
dividual packets, it has little or no effect on the number of packets
that experience some level of perturbation. On second thoughts,
this is not a completely unexpected result, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5, which plots the distribution of the amount of time by which
packets are non-conformant for different network loads. From the
figure, we see that there is indeed a shift in distribution as network
load decreases, but it does not translate into a transfer of probability
mass to zero (probability of being conformant) until very low link
loads, i.e.,  = 0:1.
Figure 3 also illustrates a somewhat unintuitive behavior, namely,
that lowering network load can increase the probability of egress
non-conformance. The specific scenario of Figure 3 where this
phenomenon is observed, is somewhat “extreme” and consists of
two streams, one tagged and one cross-traffic, that share network
links. In such a setting, when the network load is in the neigh-
borhood of  = 1, a decrease in network bandwidth yields an
increase in the number of non-conformant packets. This rather ar-
tificial behavior is caused by the combination of the specific rela-
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Figure 7: Impact of reshaping buffers. N = 20, n
cs
= 20
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Figure 8: Impact of egress token rate. Percentages refer to the
ingress conditioner token rate. N = 20, n
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tion that exists between the link speed and the token rate, and the
high likelihood of interleaved packet transmissions from the tagged
and cross-traffic streams. Specifically, it is likely that at high loads
queues will form that consist of an alternating sequence of packets
from the two streams. In such a scenario, when we have exactly


= 1, packets of the tagged stream are properly spaced apart so
that they arrive at the egress at the exact same rate as tokens are
generated. However, when the network load decreases slightly, i.e.,
the link speed increases, the likelihood of such interleaved patterns
hardly changes, but because packets are delivered faster, the likeli-
hood that some of them reach the egress policer too early increases.
Further confirmation of this interpretation was obtained by simu-
lating a number of additional scenarios, which showed that when
the token rate of the egress TBF is increased, the point where the
non-conformance probability P
d
stops decreasing as the load 
increases shifts towards the left. In other words, the network load
and, therefore, link speed that corresponds to the ideal interleaving
point, tracks the increase in token rate. Similarly, as illustrated in
Figure 4, increasing the number of streams (cross-traffic or tagged)
sharing the link, all but eliminates this behavior. This is because
realizing the desired interleaving pattern becomes highly unlikely
as the number of streams increases.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from Figures 4 and 6, is
that neither the number of cross-traffic streams nor the number of
network hops traversed by the tagged stream appear to have a ma-
jor influence on egress conformance. The only noticeable impact
is that, as illustrated in Figure 4, increasing the number of hops
traversed by the tagged stream, increases slightly the likelihood of
non-conformance at low loads. This is because interferences be-
tween streams are then rare, and crossing more hop proportionally
increases the odds of such events. In contrast, at higher loads, in-
terferences at any given hop are relatively common and, therefore,
less sensitive to potential increases due to larger hop counts.
A key, if not unexpected finding, is that the introduction of a
small reshaping buffer drastically reduces the probability of non-
conformance (Figure 7). This was found consistently across sce-
narios, and especially for “typical” scenarios with relatively low
link loads (use of a priority scheduler) and large numbers of ag-
gregated EF streams. This is because, when link loads are low
and/or the number of aggregated streams is high, the time scale
of the perturbations induced by network interferences is relatively
small. Hence, they can be easily removed through a small amount
of buffering. In particular, we see that in normal conditions, i.e.,
a token rate that is 25 % higher than the actual traffic intensity, a
buffer size of about 2 packets is sufficient to essentially eliminate
egress non-conformance. In more stressful scenarios, i.e., when
users saturate their ingress TBF , slightly larger buffers are re-
quired, but even then the buffer sizes remain small. We explores
this issue further in Section 3.3.
Another approach that we explored as a means to absorb pertur-
bations introduced by network interferences, was to increase the
egress token rate. Clearly, a higher egress token rates replenishes
the token bucket faster and can, therefore, tolerate a higher level
of non-conformance. The main question is the efficacy of such an
approach, i.e., by how much to increase the egress token rate to
absorb network induced perturbations. From Figure 8, we see that
increasing egress token rate is much less effective than buffering.
For example, lowering the probability of non-conformance by one
order of magnitude requires increasing the egress token rate by at
least 40%, while a reduction of several orders of magnitude can be
achieved using only a couple of reshaping buffers.
3.2 Variability In Packet Sizes
In this section, we investigate the impact of variable size pack-
ets. Variations in packet sizes can affect egress conformance in
a number of ways. Variations in the sizes of packets from cross-
traffic streams can translate into greater external network interfer-
ences, and therefore contribute to a higher level of egress non-
conformance. In addition, because packets consume a number of
tokens proportional to their size, the presence of variable size pack-
ets introduces internal variation that can lead to behaviors different
from those seen with only fixed size packets. As a matter of fact,
variable packet sizes alone can introduce egress non-conformance
even without any network induced perturbations. This is best un-
derstood through a simple example that illustrates how the presence
of packet of different sizes can cause egress non-conformance.
Consider a scenario where two back-to-back packets of sizes S
1
and S
2
, respectively, arrive simultaneously at the ingress TBF .
Assume further that the ingress TBF has been configured with
a rate of r and a token bucket size of b, and that it is connected
to a link of speed C, which is in turn directly connected to an
egress TBF identical to the ingress TBF . In other words, the
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Figure 9: Impact of packet size variability.
network consists of a single link of speed C connecting the ingress
and egress TBF ’s and dedicated to the traffic exiting the ingress
TBF , i.e., there is no interfering traffic. Without loss of generality,
assume that upon its arrival, the first packet finds enough tokens in
the bucket. As a result, the first packet immediately exits the TBF
and starts its transmission on the link at time t = 0. The first packet
leaves behind a total of b
1
 0 tokens, and this value together with
the token rate of r determines when the second packet of size S
2
will exit the TBF . In general, the spacing 
0
between the times
at which the second and first packets exit the ingress TBF is given
by:

0
=

0; if b
1
 S
2
(S
2
  b
1
)=r; if b
1
< S
2
(1)
Once it exists the ingress TBF , the second packet is then en-
queued for transmission on the link. Its transmission will begin
either immediately, i.e., at time t = 
0
, or once the transmission
of the first packet completes if it is still in progress at time t = 
0
.
We are interested in the spacing 
1
between the end of transmis-
sions of the first and second packets on the link of speed C, as it
corresponds to the amount of time separating their arrivals at the
egress TBF . This in turn, determines the egress conformance6 of
the second packet.
Given the absence of interfering streams, the egress spacing 
1
between the first and second packets is easily found to be given by:

1
=

S
2
=C; if (S
2
  b
1
)=r < S
1
=C
(S
2
 b
1
)
r
 
S
1
 S
2
C
; if (S
2
  b
1
)=r  S
1
=C
(2)
From Equation 2, we identify a number of cases where the sec-
ond packet will be deemed non-conformant on egress. In partic-
ular, the second packet will be non-conformant whenever r
1
<
S
2
  b
1
, since b
1
is the number of tokens left behind by the first
packet. Note that this will never occur if S
2
< b
1
, as this means
that there are enough tokens left in the bucket for the second packet
after the first packet.
6We assume that upon its arrival, the first packet finds the egress
TBF in the same state, i.e., same number of tokens, as it found the
ingress TBF when it first arrived to the network.
In the first case where (S
2
  b
1
)=r < S
1
=C, the condition
r
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is verified whenever the link speed C satisfies
rS
2
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)
< C <
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)
Note that this implies S
2
> b
1
, as expected, as well as S
2
< S
1
,
i.e., that the second packet is smaller than the first one.
In the second case where (S
2
  b
1
)=r  S
1
=C, the condition
r
1
< S
2
  b
1
is always verified for S
2
< S
1
, i.e., whenever
the second packet is smaller than the second one. Note that the
condition (S
2
  b
1
)=r  S
1
=C again implies S
2
> b
1
. As a
result, it is possible to simplify the set of conditions under which
the second packet is non-conformant on egress to be:
S
1
> S
2
> b
1
and (3)
C >
rS
2
(S
2
  b
1
)
In other words, the second packet will be non-conformant if 1) it
is smaller than the first one (S
2
< S
1
); 2) it needs to wait for tokens
(S
2
> b
1
); and 3) it crosses a link of speed C > rS2
(S
2
 b
1
)
. Note
that this latter condition means that in some cases, increasing the
speed of network links, i.e., lowering the load, can abruptly worsen
egress non-conformance. Note also that for sufficiently high link
speeds, the amount of time by which the second packet is non-
conformant is S1 S2
C
, which goes down to zero as C ! 1, but
nonetheless remains positive, i.e., lowering the load reduces but
does not eliminate non-conformance.
The above simple example has demonstrated that in the presence
of variable size packets, an initially conformant stream of packets
can be deemed non-conformant on egress, even without any net-
work interferences. This phenomenon does not exist when packets
are of fixed sizes, and points to potential difficulties if conformance
rules are strictly enforced, i.e., reshaping is not available, when
crossing domain boundaries. In the rest of this section, we explore
this issue further, and in order to isolate the respective impact of
internal and external variations in packet sizes, we consider three
possible combinations: 1. Cross streams with variable size packets
and a tagged stream with fixed size packets; 2. Cross streams with
fixed size packets and a tagged stream with variable size packets;
and 3. Cross and tagged streams both with variable size packets.
Across all three scenarios, packet sizes for streams with fixed
size packets are taken equal to 500 byte, and in the case of streams
with variable size packets, packet sizes are distributed according
to a truncated exponential distribution, with a mean packet size
of 500 bytes and a maximum packet size of 1000 bytes. As be-
fore, a single tagged stream is assumed, and the number of cross
streams is taken equal to 20 (n
cs
= 20), while a path length of
10 hops (N = 10) is assumed. Results of experiments for the
three above scenarios are found in Figures 9 and 10, which consider
token buckets of size 1000 bytes (two average size packets) and
2000 bytes (four average size packets), respectively. The main con-
clusion from these two figures is that the dominant effect in terms
of the egress conformance of a stream is its internal packet vari-
ability. In other words, variations of packet sizes within a stream
have a more pronounced effect than the potentially larger network
perturbations caused by variable packet sizes in cross streams.
This result was confirmed across a number of other configura-
tions, e.g., by increasing the number of cross streams and varying
the number of network hops crossed by the tagged stream. The
dominance of internal variability was not unexpected, as illustrated
in the previous example, given the potential for non-conformance
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Figure 10: Impact of packet size variability in the tagged
stream. (b = 2kbytes).
that variable size packets introduce even in the absence of any net-
work perturbations. However, it is also caused by the fact that
variability in packet sizes allows the generation of packets with
a size close to the bucket size itself (1; 000 bytes). Such pack-
ets require close to a full token bucket7 on egress in order to be
conformant. As a result, they are susceptible to network perturba-
tions that make them (the previous packet) arrive too early (late) at
the egress. Conversely, whenever large packets are successfully
accepted as conformant on egress, they deplete the entire token
bucket, and this can increase the likelihood that the next packet
is found non-conformant.
Exploring this issue further motivated the scenario of Figure 10,
which assumes a larger token bucket size of 2000 bytes or twice
the maximum packet size. As can be seen from Figure 10, the gap
between the two sets of curves, i.e., fixed and variable size packets
in the tagged stream, has substantially narrowed, except at very low
link loads (of the order of 10%). The reason for the persistence of
a relatively large difference at low loads is that the resulting net-
work perturbations are now small enough to be absorbed by the
added “margin” of the larger token bucket, when packet sizes are
not too large. However, for large packets, this added margin re-
mains insufficient and they continue to experience a large level of
non-conformance.
On the positive side, the relatively minor impact of external vari-
ability on conformance seems to indicate that variable size pack-
ets do not introduce significant differences, when compared to net-
works operating with fixed size packets, e.g., ATM networks. This
is of potential interest, given the extensive investigations that have
been carried out in the context of such networks.
In the next section, we revisit many of the previous issues, but in
the context of a different service model. Specifically, we consider a
service model where individual service contracts are mapped onto
aggregate provider level contracts when crossing domain bound-
aries. This affects the determination of egress conformance as mul-
tiple streams are now mapped onto a common egress TBF associ-
ated with the aggregate contract.
3.3 Aggregate Contracts
7This assumes a token bucket size of two average size packet as
used in Figure 9.
Table 1: Non-conformance (in percentage) for aggregate homo-
geneous contracts.
N=2 N=5 N=10
ncs=5 15.10 15.07 15.03
ncs=10 15.13 15.09 15.04
ncs=20 15.10 15.03 15.11
ncs=40 15.10 15.12 15.00
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 15.21 14.91 15.01
ncs=5 13.44 11.22 9.21
ncs=10 14.10 12.59 11.08
ncs=20 14.70 14.05 13.24
ncs=40 15.00 14.91 14.48
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 15.21 14.93 14.97
ncs=5 6.16 3.78 3.25
ncs=10 10.31 6.64 5.57
ncs=20 12.58 9.48 7.68
ncs=40 14.26 12.36 10.24
nts=5
ρ*=1
ncs=100 14.97 14.25 13.50
ncs=5 18.72 18.78 18.78
ncs=10 18.71 18.86 18.81
ncs=20 18.83 18.78 18.86
ncs=40 18.90 18.81 18.81
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 18.75 18.87 18.84
ncs=5 12.82 10.81 9.14
ncs=10 15.47 13.04 10.94
ncs=20 17.03 14.76 12.68
ncs=40 17.86 16.28 14.79
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 18.51 18.11 17.48
ncs=5 4.21 2.51 2.06
ncs=10 7.46 5.32 4.60
ncs=20 9.49 5.57 4.61
ncs=40 14.58 9.22 7.49
nts=20
ρ*=1
ncs=100 17.35 14.03 11.53
The service model of this section assumes that while EF streams
are individually policed on ingress, i.e., the traffic they inject into
the network must conform to their own TBF , multiple streams
are aggregated onto a common TBF , and hence jointly policed
on egress. A key factor in determining the effect of this aggregate
policing on egress conformance, is the relation that exists between
ingress TBF ’s and the egress TBF . This relation is determined
by parameters such as the number of individual streams mapped
onto the egress TBF , and how the egress token rate and bucket
size are computed from the corresponding ingress quantities.
The egress token rate is a function of the individual ingress to-
ken rates, and should normally be larger than or equal to their sum.
On the other hand, the egress bucket size is likely to depend less
on individual stream parameters, and instead be primarily dictated
by service definition. For example, the virtual leased line model of
[10], typically calls for an egress bucket size of one or two MTUs,
independent of whether the egress TBF is for a single stream or
multiple streams. As a result, the model we use in this section as-
sumes an egress token rate equal to at least the sum of the ingress
token rates, but a bucket size set to the maximum of the ingress
bucket sizes. In other words, an egress TBF aggregating n
ts
EF
streams each with ingress TBF parameters (R; b), would be con-
figured with parameters (n
ts
R; b). It should be noted that this se-
lection of egress TBF parameters is bound to result in substantial
egress non-conformance simply because of the possibility of si-
multaneous packet arrivals from multiple streams, i.e., the intrin-
sic burstiness of aggregated streams. In general, egress confor-
mance will be affected by both the potential for simultaneous ar-
rivals and by the ability of network induced perturbations to create
larger bursts. Each depends on network load, which is, therefore,
expected to also play a role. On one and, higher loads increase the
magnitude of network perturbations, which can contribute to the
formation of larger bursts. On the other hand, higher loads mean
larger queues that prevent large intrinsic bursts from propagating
undisturbed through the network. In other words, at high loads the
network can have a “smoothing” effect that limits the impact of ag-
gregating multiple streams. In this section, we explore this issue
and how egress non-conformance is in general affected by the use
of an aggregate service model.
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Figure 11: Reshaping buffer size for different levels of aggre-
gation. (N = 10, n
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= 24).
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For that purpose, egress non-conformance is measured across a
range of representative scenarios that involve varying link loads, the
number of hops crossed, the number of cross streams, and the num-
ber of (tagged) streams being aggregated onto a common egress
TBF . Several conclusions can be drawn from the data that was
gathered, which point to the complex interactions at play even in
the relatively simple configurations that were considered, i.e., ho-
mogeneous streams only. As mentioned above, there are two main
factors that influence egress conformance: 1) the size of the in-
trinsic bursts created by aggregating multiple (conformant) streams
onto the same egress TBF ; and 2) the network induced interfer-
ences that perturb initially conformant streams. In parallel to that,
there are several parameters that affect the relative impact of each
one of these two factors. In particular, the number of streams be-
ing aggregated, the number of cross streams, the number of net-
work hops being crossed, and the load on network links, all inter-
act with each other in determining the respective weight of each
factor. For example, high link loads can help smooth out large
bursts, but also contribute to higher network interferences. The
balance between these two effects depends on the magnitude of the
burst contributed by stream aggregation. Similarly, increasing the
number of cross streams can improve things by ensuring that large
intrinsic aggregate bursts are broken up, but this only holds when
the increase does not negatively affect the smoothing effect of the
network or contribute to substantially larger levels of network inter-
ferences. Finally, a similar trade-off is present when increasing the
hop count, as it can affect the relative impact of other parameters
in various ways. For example, an increase in the number of cross
traffic streams can either improve or worsen conformance depend-
ing on the hop count value. This is because, as mentioned before,
the impact of increasing the number of cross streams can be ei-
ther beneficial or detrimental depending of which of its two effects
dominate, i.e., the positive impact of breaking large intrinsic bursts
versus the negative effect of larger levels of network interferences.
And hop count affects the outcome of this trade-off, i.e., higher hop
counts increase the impact of network interferences.
The data generated from several experiments is reported in Ta-
ble 1, and provide some indications on how these different factors
interact with each other and influence egress conformance. The first
and expected conclusion one can draw from the data, is that non-
conformance is higher than when individual streams are mapped
onto their own egress TBF , and the difference increases with the
number of streams being aggregated. This can be seen by compar-
ing the results of Figure 4 for  = 1,  = 0:625, and  = 0:1
to the corresponding values for n
cs
= 20 in the second and third
columns of Table 1. The differences are quite noticeable, espe-
cially for n
ts
= 20, as expected, and interestingly are higher for
lower link loads. In general, we see from the data that higher link
load configurations result in overall better performance. As dis-
cussed earlier, this is because the smoothing effect of the network at
high loads helps limit the intrinsic burstiness of aggregated streams.
This is particularly visible in configurations with large potential in-
trinsic burstiness (n
ts
= 20) and high network smoothing oppor-
tunities (n
cs
= 5), where we can see improvements of close to an
order of magnitude in the best scenarios.
The other two parameters that also determine how the intrinsic
burstiness of aggregated streams and network interferences affect
egress conformance, are the hop count N and the number of cross
streams n
cs
. From the table, we see that, at least for the scenar-
ios considered here, increases in hop count typically improve per-
formance, while increases in the number of cross streams usually
degrade performance. This exemplifies the trade-off that exists be-
tween the greater level of network perturbations that higher hop
counts or number of cross streams induces, and the greater likeli-
hood that aggregate bursts will be broken-up as they traverse the
network. For example, at low link loads ( = 0:1), changes in
either parameter have little or no effect, while differences emerge
as link load increases due to the greater impact of traffic interac-
tions in the network. In the context of homogeneous streams, it
turns out that the break-up of aggregate streams caused by crossing
a larger number of hops is the dominant effect, hence the improve-
ment in egress conformance, while the negative impact of the per-
turbations created by larger numbers of cross streams is the more
influential effect. However, it should be noted that, as we will see
in the next section where we explore more realistic (heterogeneous)
traffic mixes, this outcome is sensitive to the selected configuration.
It should, therefore, only be interpreted as representative of the in-
teractions that take place, and not necessarily as a conclusion that
applies consistently across all scenarios.
After exploring some of the interactions that affect egress confor-
mance, we investigate next what it takes to absorb non-conformance
in the context of an aggregate service model. As before, we con-
sider two mechanisms, namely, the use of reshaping buffers and
increasing the egress token rate. When a reshaping buffer is used,
we compare, for a given level of egress conformance, the size of
the reshaping buffer needed with an aggregate service model, to the
sum of the reshaping buffers needed in the case of individual ser-
vice contracts. The results are shown in Figure 11, which plots the
total amount of reshaping buffers needed to achieve a given level of
conformance (P
d
 10
 5), as a function of the number of streams
being aggregated onto the same egress TBF . The figure considers
a total of 24 streams, so that the number of streams being aggre-
gated ranges from 1 (every stream has its own service contract and,
therefore, reshaping buffer) to 24 (all the streams are aggregated
onto a common contract and, therefore, share the same reshap-
ing buffer). The main, although expected, conclusion is that ag-
gregation ultimately reduces the total amount of reshaping buffer-
ing needed. This highlight the benefits of large aggregate contract
(when reshaping is used) in terms of buffer requirements. Further-
more, reshaping delays should also be lower because of the smaller
ratio of total buffer size to aggregate rate. The effect of increasing
the egress token rate is investigated next using a scenario where 20
streams are aggregated onto the same egress TBF (n
ts
= 20),
the number of cross streams is 100 (n
cs
= 100), and the streams
cross a total of N = 10 network hops. The results are displayed in
Figure 12, which confirms the earlier finding that while increasing
egress token rates improves things, it is relatively inefficient, i.e., a
takes more than doubling the egress rate to achieve a reduction of
an order of magnitude in non-conformance.
In the next section, we extend the basic scenarios we have ex-
plored so far, and investigate the effect of heterogeneity such as
differences in (average) packet sizes and token rates.
4. HETEROGENEOUS SOURCES
The use of homogeneous streams was motivated by the need to
better isolate the impact of various parameters, but this is clearly
not representative of the environment one is likely to encounter in
practice. In particular, rates and packet distributions are expected
to vary across EF streams, and the impact of such differences is a
dimension we explore in this section. We do so by constructing an
heterogeneous traffic mix consisting of streams with variable size
packets, different average rates, and average packets sizes. The
investigation is carried out in the context of both individual and
aggregate service models. The next two sub-sections are devoted
to scenarios with individual service contracts, for which the impact
of different rates and packet sizes are respectively considered. The
last sub-section considers the case of aggregate contracts.
4.1 Heterogeneity In Rates
This section focuses on the impact of rate differences, and dis-
tinguishes between three types of flows with ratesR
1
= 0:1 Mbps,
R
2
= 1 Mbps and R
3
= 10 Mbps 8. We use three tagged streams,
one for each rate value, and measure their egress conformance after
crossing a number of network hops. At each network hop, the three
tagged streams interact with 30 cross-traffic streams, 10 from each
rate group. All streams are fed by Poisson traffic sources. In ad-
dition, in order to limit the number of parameters being varied, all
streams transmit fixed-size packets of size 500 bytes. The impact
of different packet sizes is explored in the next sub-section.
The results for this set of experiments are shown in Table 2,
where both the egress policer rate (P
R
) and the load () on the
network links are varied. The main conclusion is that the only con-
figurations that exhibit noticeable differences are at high link loads
(

). At high loads, the efficiency of increasing the egress token
rate to minimize non-conformance (without requiring reshaping)
is lower for high rate streams than for low rate ones. The reason
is again that higher rates translate into shorter time scales, which
make streams more susceptible to network perturbations. This is
best understood from examples based on Table 2.
Specifically, consider the case where the egress token rate is 10%
higher than the corresponding ingress rate. In this case, the time
needed to generate enough tokens for a packet on egress is 91% of
what it takes on ingress. For the three types of streams of Table 2
with egress token rates of P
R1
= 0:125 Mbps, P
R2
= 1:25 Mbps,
and P
R3
= 12:5 Mbps, the corresponding amounts of time by
which a packet can arrive early on egress are 2900s, 290s, 29s,
respectively. In comparison, the transmission time of a single 500
bytes packet on a network link is 26:2s (for =1). This means
that for high rate streams, a 10% higher egress token generation
rate is barely capable of absorbing network perturbations of about
one packet. In contrast, for streams with a rate of 0:125 Mbps, a
10% higher egress token generation rate translates into an ability
to absorb network perturbations of about 100 packets. More than
enough to eliminate any egress non-conformance.
On the other hand, as we have seen in previous sections, although
decreasing the network load does not (initially) reduce the number
of non-conformant packets, it does reduce the amount (of time)
by which they are non-conformant. As a result, we expect the
above difference to diminish and eventually disappear for lower
link loads. This can be verified from Table 2, where for  = 0:4
the differences between high and low bandwidth streams has all
but disappeared. The network perturbations are now minimum,
and even the small margin afforded to high bandwidth streams by
higher egress token generation rates is sufficient to accommodate
them.
Table 2: Percentage of non-conformant packets. S
R
source
rate; P
R
egress policer rate
S
R
P
R


= 1 

= 0:4 

= 0:1
(Mbps) (Mbps)
0:1 0:125 4:51 0:31 3:91 0:24 1:60 0:16
0:138 0 0 0
1 1:25 4:63 0:06 3:79 0:07 1:37 0:03
1:375  0:0087 0 0
10 12:5 4:64 0:03 3:43 0:02 1:12 0:006
13:75 1:64 0:017 0:024 0:0023 0
15 0:71 0:009  0:0005 0
16:25 0:35 0:006 0 0
One of the conclusions from the results of this section is that
when reshaping is not available at domain boundaries, it appears
best to negotiate small contracts with an egress rate higher than the
8For all three, the ingress token generation rate is again set to be
25% higher than the traffic rate
ingress rate. In addition, priority based schemes (low load) should
also be used inside the network in order to minimize the magnitude
of perturbations.
Table 3: Percentage of non-conformant packets. S packet size
S(bytes) 

= 1 

= 0:4 

= 0:1
40 0 0 0
200 0:11  0:006 0:089  0:006 0:037  0:006
1000 4:61  0:11 3:85 0:065 1:41  0:064
4.2 Heterogeneity in Packet Sizes
In this section, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity in packet
sizes rather than stream bandwidths, which are kept identical across
streams. As before, we consider three types of streams, this time
with different packet sizes equal to S
1
= 40 bytes, S
2
= 200 bytes,
and S
3
= 1000 bytes. Packet sizes are kept fixed within each
stream. Varying packet sizes within a stream, as done in Sec-
tion 3.2, contributed only minor differences and was, therefore,
omitted to simplify the discussion. All streams have identical ingress
and egress TBF s, with token rates set 25% higher than the source
data rate, and bucket sizes equal to 2; 000 bytes.
The results from the experiments are displayed in Table 3, and
do not add much to the findings of Section 3.2. As expected, the
streams with the bigger packets experienced the worst level of non-
conformance. This is intuitive as the transmission (reception) of
a 1000 bytes packet requires the availability of half a full token
bucket. As a result, the margin of tokens left behind by each packet
will typically be smaller for streams that generate large packets than
for streams with small packet. This in turn makes the former more
susceptible to network perturbations.
4.3 Heterogeneity and Aggregate Contracts
We consider next what is likely to be the more common sce-
nario in practice, namely, a mixture of streams with different aver-
age packets sizes and rates, combined with the use of an aggregate
service model. In addition, we also assume that packet sizes can
vary within a stream, again according to a truncated exponential
distribution. Streams are selected from the following combinations
of average rates and average packet sizes: (0:1 Mbps,40 bytes),
(1 Mbps,40 bytes), (1 Mbps,200 bytes),(1 Mbps,500 bytes) and
(10 Mbps,500 bytes). As before, the ingress bucket rate was cho-
sen to be 25% higher than the average source data rate, and both
the ingress and egress bucket sizes were set to 1; 000 bytes, the
maximum packet size. In our first experiment, the token rate of
the aggregate egress TBF ’s was configured to be the sum of the
corresponding ingress token rates. It was varied in subsequent ex-
periments.
The data generated from these experiments is found in Table 4,
and confirm many of the findings obtained with the simple homo-
geneous scenarios. However, because of the more complex nature
of the interactions generated by the richer mix of traffic, we also
observe some differences. They reflect the fact that the boundaries
of the regions where the influence of different individual parame-
ters dominates, shift as a function of the traffic mix. Nevertheless,
there are a number of basic results that remain unchanged.
First and foremost, as can be seen from columns N = 5 and
N = 10 of Table 4, the level of egress non-conformance in the ag-
gregate service model remains higher than in the individual service
model. Interestingly though, the difference is less than what was
observed in the earlier homogeneous scenario. This is in part due
to the presence of streams with smaller packets, but also reflects the
Table 4: Non-conformance (in percentage) for aggregate het-
erogeneous contracts.
N=2 N=5 N=10
ncs=5 4.41 5.84 8.68
ncs=10 4.28 5.16 7
ncs=20 4.22 4.67 5.67
ncs=40 4.1 4.35 4.86
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 4.15 4.22 4.36
ncs=5 6.18 11.87 16.54
ncs=10 5.54 10.44 15.71
ncs=20 4.96 8.42 13.31
ncs=40 4.55 6.51 10.05
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 4.28 5.01 6.58
ncs=5 5.82 8.18 9.31
ncs=10 5.68 8.6 10.62
ncs=20 5.28 8.06 10.94
ncs=40 4.84 6.94 9.83
nts=5
ρ*=1
ncs=100 4.43 5.55 7.43
ncs=5 8.53 9.63 11.96
ncs=10 8.48 9.39 11.27
ncs=20 8.44 9.08 10.40
ncs=40 8.4 8.79 9.61
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 8.35 8.54 8.85
ncs=5 8.44 12.35 16.09
ncs=10 8.54 12.27 16.51
ncs=20 8.61 11.79 16.42
ncs=40 8.6 10.89 15.2
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 8.51 9.67 12.23
ncs=5 5.82 6.95 7.28
ncs=10 6.76 8.3 8.91
ncs=20 7.48 9.26 10.54
ncs=40 7.94 9.47 11.66
nts=20
ρ*=1
ncs=100 8.23 8.98 11.09
fact that the wider range of traffic interactions in an heterogeneous
setting helps break-up the intrinsic bursts formed by aggregating
multiple streams. This wider range of interactions also leads to a
number of differences with an homogeneous environment. They
are mostly representative of how different trade-offs play-out un-
der the more diverse conditions of heterogeneous traffic mixes. For
example, while higher link loads are still often beneficial because
of the greater network smoothing effect they afford, this benefit is
not as consistent as in the homogeneous case. In particular, larger
intrinsic bursts, i.e., larger values of n
ts
, and higher load levels, are
typically required before the payoff becomes apparent. For exam-
ple, the benefits of higher link loads are not seen in the n
ts
= 5
or  = 0:625 scenarios. Instead, they require the larger intrinsic
bursts of n
ts
= 20 and load levels of  = 1.
As discussed in the preceding section, increasing the number of
streams being aggregated onto a common egress TBF has two
competing effects: potentially larger intrinsic bursts together with
the opportunity for higher network smoothing because the aggre-
gate traffic represents a greater fraction of link capacity. The latter
effect diminishes when network load decreases, so that the nega-
tive effect of larger bursts ultimately dominates. Similarly, while
increasing the number of network hops traversed by streams typi-
cally improved performance in the homogeneous case, this is not
so when streams are heterogeneous. Instead, increasing N consis-
tently degrades performance. This is because the greater network
perturbations implied by higher hop counts are now dominating, in
part due to the fact that the benefit of breaking up intrinsic bursts
is often already achieved simply through interactions between het-
erogeneous streams.
Finally, another area of difference is in terms of the impact of
the number of cross streams. In the homogeneous case, a larger
number of cross streams consistently worsened performance, while
this does not hold in heterogeneous scenarios. Increasing the num-
ber of cross-traffic streams actually improves performance in some
scenarios, i.e., for small number of aggregated streams (n
ts
= 5)
and especially for large number of network hops being crossed
(N = 10). The main reason behind this behavior is that while
aggregating only a small number of streams ensures a lower ini-
tial burstiness, that burstiness can still be increased by interactions
with other streams in the network, especially when the number of
network hops crossed is high. However, as the number of cross-
traffic streams increases, the large number of independent inter-
ferences combined with the higher speed of the links, and hence
the lower relative magnitude of those interferences, ultimately im-
proves performance. This phenomenon was not observed in the
homogeneous scenario because of its lower initial burstiness. It
is also not observed at high network loads, because the decrease in
network smoothing due to the larger number of cross-traffic streams
is the dominant effect.
In general, the above discussion points to the fact that in a more
realistic heterogeneous environment, careful consideration must be
given to the relative weights of the different parameters. For ex-
ample, large aggregate contracts may or may not be beneficial de-
pending on the type of queueing mechanism used in the network
(high vs low load), and the intrinsic burstiness of the streams be-
ing aggregated. This means that in practice it will be difficult to
accurately predict the level of egress non-conformance that can be
expected. However, this may not be as severe an issue as it ap-
pears, as the sheer magnitude of the levels of non-conformance be-
ing observed even in the best scenarios, i.e., small contracts and
low loads, mandates the use of additional mechanisms to absorb
non-conformance at network boundaries. As discussed earlier, the
two possible approaches available are either reshaping buffers or
higher egress token rates. Fortunately, both yield results that are
similar to what was observed in the homogeneous case, even if the
relative inefficiency of relying on higher egress token rates is now
more pronounced.
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Figure 13: Impact of increasing egress token rate. (N = 10,
n
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= 20, n
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= 100).
In particular, the size of the reshaping buffers needed to reduce
Table 5: Required egress buffer size (in packets) to achieve a
non-conformance probability  10 5 for aggregate heteroge-
neous contracts.
ncs=5 4 4 5
ncs=10 4 4 5
ncs=20 4 4 4
ncs=40 4 4 4
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 4 4 4
ncs=5 4 5 7
ncs=10 4 5 6
ncs=20 4 5 5
ncs=40 4 5 5
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 4 4 5
ncs=5 4 5 5
ncs=10 5 5 6
ncs=20 4 5 6
ncs=40 4 5 5
nts=5
ρ*=1
ncs=100 4 4 5
ncs=5 8 8 9
ncs=10 8 8 8
ncs=20 8 8 8
ncs=40 8 8 8
ρ*=0.1
ncs=100 8 8 8
ncs=5 8 8 9
ncs=10 8 8 9
ncs=20 8 8 9
ncs=40 8 8 9
ρ*=0.625
ncs=100 8 8 9
ncs=5 5 4 4
ncs=10 6 5 5
ncs=20 7 6 6
ncs=40 7 7 8
nts=20
ρ*=1
ncs=100 8 8 8
N=2 N=5 N=10
egress non-conformance to acceptable levels, remains relatively small,
and the efficiency of using buffers still improves as the number
of streams being aggregated increases. This is illustrated in Ta-
ble 5, which shows that a maximum buffer size of 9 packets, i.e.,
4; 500 bytes, is sufficient to ensure a non-conformance probabil-
ity P
d
of less than 10 5 when aggregating 20 streams. This is
similar to what was required in the case of homogeneous streams,
and is to be compared with a buffer size of about one packet per
stream for individual contracts, i.e., a total buffer size of 20 pack-
ets (see Figure 11). Furthermore, efficiency still improves as the
number of streams being aggregated increases. This can be seen
by comparing for all configurations, the total buffer size needed for
one aggregate contract of 20 streams, to what four contracts of 5
streams each require. This means that the earlier conclusion that
egress non-conformance can be absorbed through small reshaping
buffers, still holds even in the presence of heterogeneous streams.
The data of Table 5 also confirms other earlier findings regarding
aggregate contracts. For example, we see that increasing the num-
ber of cross streams is usually beneficial, i.e., results in smaller
reshaping buffers, except in configurations where network shaping
has the potential to substantially reduce the intrinsic burstiness of
stream aggregates, i.e., when both the load and the number of ag-
gregated streams are high. This is similar to what was observed in
Table 4.
The other mechanism available to absorb egress non-conformance,
is to increase the egress token rate, and its effect is shown in Fig-
ure 13. The results are similar to those of Figure 12, except for
the previously mentioned decrease in efficiency of such a mecha-
nism, as well as some minor differences due to the more complex
interactions created by heterogeneous traffic. For example, while
increasing load uniformly improved performance in the homoge-
neous scenario of Figure 12, i.e., it both lowered non-conformance
and also increased the rate of improvements achievable through
higher egress rates, Figure 13 shows a slightly different behavior.
In particular, while higher loads still imply greater efficiency (the
slope of decrease of non-conformance as a function of the egress
rate is higher for  = 1), the relative ordering of non-conformance
levels is different. This difference is consistent with the data of Ta-
ble 4, and again reflects the impact of more varied interactions in
the presence of heterogeneity.
5. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to better understand the impact of traf-
fic aggregation on conformance, in the context of a service built on
top of the Differentiated Services EF PHB. The focus was on iden-
tifying the level of non-conformance that crossing a Diff-Serv do-
main introduces into initially conformant streams. This was inves-
tigated for two possible models of service contracts: service con-
tracts that extend individual service agreements across domains,
and service contracts that map individual agreements onto aggre-
gate provider level service contracts. The paper also explored two
different approaches, i.e., egress reshaping and higher egress token
rates, for absorbing non-conformance on egress.
The findings of the paper confirm that reshaping is, if not manda-
tory, by far the most efficient way to eliminate egress non-conformance.
The amount of reshaping buffers required is typically small, i.e., of
the order of a few packets, and when multiple streams are mapped
onto aggregate contracts, the relative amount of buffering required
for each stream decreases, i.e., efficiency improves. However, re-
shaping may not always be available, especially on very high speed
links, and the use of higher token egress rates combined with low
network loads (priority based support of EF traffic) may provide
an alternative, at least in the context of individual service con-
tracts. For example, Figure 8 shows that for link loads of 0:4, an
increase of 20% in the egress token rate brings the probability of
non-conformance down to 10 5 . Such a solution is unfortunately
not effective in the case of aggregate contracts for which increas-
ing the egress rate yields only much smaller improvements. As a
result, the use of reshaping appears unavoidable in those cases. In
general, while the paper clearly did not cover all possible scenar-
ios and parameter settings, it should provide useful information on
how to offer and dimension services based on the EF PHB.
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